

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

PRIVATE

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 7 September 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R. EDBERG

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. E. RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. JANOS LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. BUCEK
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATC GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. P.M. GEORGE
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. S. ROGULSKI
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. B.I. POKIAD
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the eighty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union, Romania, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

Before calling on the representative of Canada I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to document ENDC/61/Rev.1, tabled at our last meeting and containing the draft report to the United Nations recommended by the two co-Chairmen. The document as it appears before us today includes the amendment on which the co-Chairmen were in agreement at our last meeting.

I would suggest that we should begin by considering this draft report before we proceed to the list of speakers and, in suggesting this, I think I can say that I am in agreement with the co-Chairmen. Has any representative any comments to make with regard to the proposed procedure?

As there appears to be no objection, I take it that the Committee agrees to follow that procedure.

Has any representative any comments to make on the draft report?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I just want to call attention to the fact that in paragraph 2 of section II on page 3 of the report a blank has been left for the number of plenary meetings, because we did not know last night whether there would be one or two meetings today. There is also a blank in paragraph 1 of section V on page 5 for the number of meetings which the Sub-Committee has held. This can now be filled in; the figure that should be inserted there is "seven".

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Then the figure "seven" will be inserted in paragraph 1 of section V and the number of plenary meetings will be inserted in paragraph 2 of section II after our meeting or meetings today.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I would like to raise a small drafting point. It is not of importance and I will not press it if it creates any difficulty. It occurs to me that, since the question of the Sub-Committee's continuing to meet during the recess was discussed and decided at a plenary meeting of the Conference,

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 9 of section II, page 5, might be reworded along the following lines:

"At the eighty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on 5 September 1962, the Delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, agreed that the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests would continue to meet in Geneva during the recess."

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I would ask the co-Chairmen whether they have any comments on the proposed amendment.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In accordance with the working paper previously adopted by the Conference the Sub-Committee is the master of its own procedures, so I would not think that the amendment suggested by Brazil would be appropriate.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): In that case I will not press the point.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Unless there are any further comments I shall take it that everyone is in agreement and that the draft report to the United Nations contained in document ENDC/61/Rev.1 is adopted.

I now call on the first speaker on my list, the representative of Canada.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In the last two days that we have been meeting several representatives have given us a balance sheet of the accomplishment of our Conference during its meetings from 14 March until the present time. I do not propose today to attempt such an extensive summing up, but I would like to touch on a few points relating to our present position and to give the Canadian delegation's views on how, from the time we reconvene, we should direct our efforts in our attempt to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Canadian delegation, of course --- like, I suppose, every other delegation here --- would have hoped that the report which we have just approved could have contained a record of more positive achievement. I am afraid it does not take very

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

long to summarize what we have done during the six months -- less a month's recess -- that we have been sitting around this table. In general, we have set up a framework in which to work, that is, the two draft treaties and the procedures we have used in examining them, and we have explored differences and found some points of contact where agreement is possible -- and that is good as far as it goes. What we have to do now in general terms is to extend the areas of agreement and overcome those differences.

In that connexion I must say a few words about our institution of co-Chairmen. The Canadian delegation thinks that that institution and the way it is worked is one of the most favourable developments of the Conference. The Committee has applauded the co-Chairmen when they have managed to agree on any item, and when they have not been able to agree we all hope that they will come to some agreement in the not too distant future. Our co-Chairmen, Mr. Dean and Mr. Kuznetsov, bear very heavy responsibilities, and not only to their own great countries and to their allies, for, as Mr. Padilla Nervo showed us on 5 September (ENDC/PV.80, pp.40 et seq.), their countries have in the eyes of the world the principal responsibility to stop nuclear testing as a first step and then to stop the arms race and remove the terrible threat of nuclear war under which we are living. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union at this table are for our Conference the agents for taking the actions which those responsibilities to the world demand.

The Canadian delegation takes this opportunity to thank our co-Chairmen for the arduous work that they have put in, and echoes the hope of the representative of Mexico that they will keep in consultation during the recess, and offers its best wishes for increased and more fruitful co-operation.

As the Canadian delegation has said before there is no doubt that all the members of this Conference believe -- and we think the world believes -- that what is of most immediate importance is to agree on a treaty to stop nuclear testing. We have made our statement on this and I do not intend to repeat it. The Canadian delegation, however, urges the nuclear Powers to keep in the forefront of their minds the urgent pleas for action which have been made by so many of the non-aligned nations here. We were happy to hear on Wednesday that the Soviet Union agreed to the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom to keep the Sub-Committee on the cessation of nuclear testing in operation during the recess, and we hope that they will soon succeed in bridging the relatively small gap between the positions of the two sides.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The next points on which it seems to the Canadian delegation that it would be desirable and also possible to make progress after the recess have been mentioned by the representative of Brazil who said on Monday:

"... it is imperative that we reach an immediate agreement on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, prevention of war by accident, miscalculation and failure in the system of communications. Like the test ban issue, those are immediate issues on which we should act forthwith, as they are the ones with a more direct bearing on the possibility of a conflict and consequently of the destruction of the human race." (ENDC/PV.78, p.49)

The representative of the United Arab Republic also supported that view (ENDC/PV.81, p.47).

The Canadian delegation feels that it should not be difficult in renewed meetings of the Conference to reach agreement on those two points after, we hope, achieving a nuclear test cessation treaty. That would greatly help in reducing tensions and making conditions more favourable for the negotiation of general and complete disarmament. We must do something concrete, and do it soon, to improve confidence between nations if we are to succeed in our ultimate task.

Now let me pass to our discussions on general and complete disarmament. Everyone here is aware that the most serious differences between the positions of the Soviet Union and those of the Western allies concern the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles -- the means of delivering the nuclear weapon. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries claim that their proposals would eliminate the danger of nuclear war in twenty months. All nations here represented -- in fact, everybody in the world -- would like to see the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. But how can it be done? Can it be done by one magic stroke or by agreement to a simple formula? We have advanced many arguments from the Western side to show that the Soviet proposals are not a panacea and would not abolish, as they claim, the danger of nuclear war in twenty months. It is not possible to obliterate human knowledge, experience and science, and bring the world back to where it was before the secrets of atomic and nuclear explosions were discovered. The fruit of that knowledge is bitter indeed, but it will remain with us. We may destroy specialized nuclear weapon vehicles, but improvised means of delivery can be found if nations are embattled. We may search out and dismantle nuclear bombs and warheads, but nuclear explosives will remain to make other bombs if nations go to war.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

One could compare the situation we are in now, and our need to free the world from the danger of a nuclear war to the position of a householder during the last great war near whose house a huge bomb --- a "block-buster" --- fell and failed to explode. What was done? Experts were brought and they started the process of defusing the bomb. This was a very dangerous and delicate operation and was done step by step, with great precaution; because if a mistake was made the bomb would explode, with disaster to the householder and the neighbourhood.

The Canadian delegation suggests that that is an analogy of the way we should go about removing the threat of nuclear war. We should move by careful steps from the uneasy balance of the nuclear deterrent, which now prevents either side from starting a nuclear war --- or a major conventional war --- to the safer situation we seek for the opposed alliances and for the world, where we shall no longer be sitting over an unexploded bomb. But it is an operation that must be carried out with great care, circumspection and skill. A blundering approach could initiate the very disaster we hope to avoid. In plainer words, the Canadian delegation thinks that the answer to the problem is reduction by stages; it necessarily requires a step by step elimination. Hence we have supported the concept of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as set forth in the United States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty". We would point out that the United States delegation has many times said that its plan is not immutable and that provisions in it are subject to negotiation.

We have criticized the Soviet Union proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles in the first stage mainly on two grounds. The first is that they have not shown how it is possible to demonstrate, with 100 per cent certainty, that in the first stage 100 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles have been destroyed and none remain. We have asked many times how they propose to accomplish that, and we have had no satisfactory answer.

In the United States proposals gradual elimination of the nuclear weapons vehicles, in stages, is accompanied by the gradual extension of verification by the zone inspection system. We feel that the zone system is not fully understood by the Conference. Certainly it is not understood by the Soviet Union and the socialist States here, to judge by their references to it. The system seems to the Canadian delegation to hold much promise, but it needs much more detailed exposition and explanation before the Conference can fully understand how it will work, and whether it will solve the problem which confronts us.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In his speech on 5 September, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, indicated a possible important change in the Soviet position on nuclear disarmament, and I quote his words:

"... the Soviet Government announces its willingness -- if the Western Powers agree -- to transfer all measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and cessation of production, from the second stage to the first.

"Do the Western Powers agree to this?" (ENDC/FV.81, p.15)

The Canadian delegation welcomes this evidence of flexibility. It is our opinion that a start should be made on the elimination of nuclear weapons -- that is nuclear and atomic bombs and warheads -- in the first stage. But at first sight it would seem to us to be entirely impracticable to carry out, in the first stage, the full range of measures proposed in article 22 of the Soviet Union draft treaty in the first stage of disarmament, and for the following reasons.

I have said that the Soviet Union delegation has failed to explain how the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles in the first stage could be verified; and now it is suggesting compounding the problem by steps which would require the verification of the elimination of 100 per cent of nuclear weapons, also in the first stage. The Soviet representative also gave a dusty answer to Mr. Lall, the representative of India, when he said:

"... the Soviet Union is not at all opposed to taking part in agreeing lists of delivery vehicles, when the time comes for that, when the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles in the first stage has itself been decided in principle." (ibid., p.9)

That would seem to mean that the West, and all parties to the treaty, must agree to destroy something before the Soviet Union will tell us what it is we have to destroy. If in fact all possible means of delivery of the nuclear weapon were to be destroyed in stage I, that would mean, so far as the Canadian delegation has been able to learn, the elimination of all guns and mortars down to 5-inch (that is, 120 mm) calibre and most modern fighter and attack bomber aircraft. The Soviet Union proposals, if taken literally, would require that all those armaments be eliminated in stage I, and also now all nuclear bombs and warheads. The problem of determining the total number of such nuclear weapons, and the total amount of fissile explosive material available is notorious. difficult.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Therefore, these Soviet proposals would require that practically all meaningful disarmament would take place in the first stage, which would be absurd. The Soviet Union might ponder on the statement of Mr. Padilla Norvo, when he said during our eightieth meeting:

"One of the principles agreed on by the great Powers to serve as a basis for our negotiations is the principle that disarmament should be implemented by stages (ENDC/5, paragraph 4). That is a wise and, indeed, indispensable principle, since the difficulty of the task demands that it be carried out in stages. Only God himself could say 'Let there be light, and there was light'; but there are no leaps in nature. The greatest achievements of man and his science have been made by small steps." (ENDC/PV.80, p.31)

What the Canadian delegation would like to see is a serious discussion between the nuclear Powers, with the participation of the rest of us, to determine how a start can be made in the first stage in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons; and we think that as many of them should be eliminated as possible, consonant with the agreed principles.

I should like to quote again from the statement of the representative of Brazil:

"... I wish to place on record that we still feel the advisability of the establishment of an extra group on control should be examined and given serious consideration by the Committee, when it reconvenes in November, for political decisions on disarmament and control cannot be worked out in a technical vacuum." (ENDC/PV.73, p.49)

The Canadian delegation supports this proposal strongly. It was originally made by the former Brazilian representative, Mr. de Mello Franco, who is now Foreign Minister of Brazil, and we supported it at that time. The representative of the United Arab Republic also supported the idea of a study of technical factors in order to reach agreement on disputed questions (ENDC/PV.81, p. 42)

We have been told many times by the Soviet Union, and by those who agree with its views, that what we need are political decisions. But, when there are two sides which do not agree on the policies to be applied, how is this difficulty to be solved, how are the political decisions to be reached? We shall soon be going to

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the United Nations General Assembly. I do not think that anyone here will claim that the questions we have not agreed upon can be solved by a vote in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union delegation has claimed that the establishment of technical study groups would create the illusion of progress when in fact there was none. But I would ask: what could be more illusory, more deceptive or ultimately more dangerous than a so-called political decision which was not firmly based on a thorough understanding of the facts? Politics, people say, is the art of the possible. We should decide which alternative proposal to adopt as a basis for the eventual treaty from the standpoint of which is possible, which is the most workable.

We must examine the problem on the concrete, practical plane -- and that means the technical plane. As the representative of Ethiopia put it to us, we shall not get anywhere now by scratching out words from texts and putting in others, unless we agree on the basic ideas of what we want to do. Our task is not just to take a political decision on the grounds of what is a desirable object. The real political decision in that respect was taken last year, when the principles of negotiating general and complete disarmament were agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. It was decided that general and complete disarmament would include:

"Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons,"

and also

"Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction." (ENDC/5)

What we have to do in this Conference is to find ways and means of putting into effect the decision which was then taken. What we have to determine is the how and the when and the where. It is a matter for us to discuss in detail, and those best able to carry out these detailed discussions and to advise the chiefs of delegations in the matter should be brought here for the purpose.

I should like briefly to state the second reason why the Canadian delegation has opposed the Soviet first-Stage plan. We oppose it because the elimination of the nuclear deterrent, together with the elimination of what the Soviet Union chooses to call foreign bases, but which should more properly be called the bases of the North Atlantic Alliance, is not in accordance with the principle of balance. In our view,

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and we think we have explained our view so that it can be understood by the Conference, the Soviet first-Stage proposals, if executed, would leave an imbalance in the military strength in Europe, an imbalance strongly in favour of the Soviet side.

The Canadian delegation hopes that the discussion on disarmament which will take place in the General Assembly will give the members of our Conference some new ideas. We shall certainly find it useful to hear what nations not represented in this Committee think of our efforts, and perhaps we shall get some pointers from them on the solution of the problems which face us and which we have not been able to solve so far. We hope that will be so; but, whatever guidance and inspiration we may get at the United Nations General Assembly, the Canadian delegation feels sure that if the problems of agreement on general and complete disarmament are to be solved it must be by patient, hard work at the conference table here in Geneva. We look forward to seeing some of our colleagues in New York and all of you here in November.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): This is the last day of the second session of our Conference. There is no time for me to comment in detail on all the statements made at our last few meetings or to sum up in any detail all the problems which have occupied us. I should simply like to say that the Italian delegation remains sincerely convinced of the utility of our work, of its necessity and urgency.

It is true that after five months of discussion serious divergencies of method and of principle still exist between us. On the other hand, many problems have been clarified and on certain of them, and these by no means the least important, the different points of view have come somewhat closer together. Thus we shall come to the United Nations General Assembly with the balance sheet, admittedly very modest, which is contained in the report we have approved this morning (ENDC/62), but not with completely empty hands. We have tackled a great task and have obtained a few preliminary results which, though partial and limited, will enable us to get nearer our goal when we resume our proceedings on 12 November. Our fixing of this date is, in itself, evidence that nobody regards our work as barren, and that we all have confidence in future progress.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Similarly, I should like to welcome the decision of the nuclear Sub-Committee to continue its work in Geneva during the recess.

One of the problems which we have examined stands out for its particular urgency and gravity. That is the problem of nuclear tests. And as time is pressing, it is on that problem that I wish to speak very briefly.

The Italian delegation had hoped that the solution to this problem might be found during the present session, because all the elements for an agreement were present. Unfortunately, these hopes have not been fulfilled and now, before separating, we must assign responsibilities and prepare to present this problem constructively to the United Nations General Assembly.

The banning of nuclear tests has two aspects. First, as a measure for eliminating the danger of the lethal radiation produced by the tests, and secondly, as a step towards stopping the armaments race. The first aspect concerns only tests in outer space, in the atmosphere and under the sea; the second concerns all tests, including underground tests. From this latter point of view the banning of tests, like all disarmament measures, demands appropriate control. This necessity is recognized in the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28), as it is obvious to us that the eight delegations never dreamed of proposing a system which allowed evasion and which did not envisage necessary inspection measures.

Thus there came a time when our discussion on underground tests arrived at the basic technical problem of knowing what controls are strictly necessary; in other words, we arrived at the question of on-site inspection. On this question two different answers have been given; these answers differ in principle as well as in method.

The Western delegations, with the technical help of their experts, offered scientific evidence for their statements. The Soviet delegation, on the contrary, refused to give such evidence and replied dogmatically: You can believe us, they said, that on-site inspections are never necessary; trust us; accept this principle, and then we shall work out the technical implications. This negative Soviet position was neither explained nor justified. There is no reason of military secrecy preventing reciprocal information on the detection systems at the disposal of both parties. Even the most up-to-date seismographs are not weapons of war. The Soviet opposition to all scientific discussion on the control of tests for the purpose of permitting the practical application of the memorandum

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

is the more surprising because eminent Soviet personalities who took part at the Accra conference in June found no difficulty in supporting technical studies on armaments. It is true that the Soviet delegation here, while refusing a scientific discussion of the two opposing arguments, does not exclude the possibility of their voluntarily allowing certain on-site inspections. But this, obviously, gives not the slightest guarantee. A country could in this way allow on-site inspections whenever it had not carried out tests and refuse them at a time when it had really carried them out. This, therefore, is unacceptable.

Since a comprehensive agreement appeared for the moment blocked by the Soviet attitude, the Western delegations tried to explore the possibilities of a limited agreement, while continuing their efforts to reach comprehensive agreement. The Italian delegation believes that in the field of tests, as in others, it is necessary, if we wish to obtain results, to approach the problem gradually, by eliminating difficulties one by one and solving first those problems whose solution is less arduous.

The delegations of the socialist countries do not share this point of view. They prefer to try to go one better, and that is the reason for our failure. We know that a partial treaty would not produce a fully satisfactory solution, since it would not prevent the continuance of underground tests. But this partial agreement would immediately alleviate mankind's most serious anxieties.

Several appeals have been addressed to the nuclear Powers to stop these tests which threaten the very being of the human race and of future generations, and the seriousness of the danger has been impressively stated. I recall the moving speech, a little while ago, of the Indian representative, Mr. Lall, who spoke of the millions of deformed beings who might be born as a result of atmospheric testing. Similar statements have been made at recent meetings by the Ethiopian delegation and other delegations. These appeals, which were addressed to the three nuclear Powers, are now, after the Anglo-American proposals, directed solely to the Soviet Union, since it is for that country to decide if these terrible dangers shall continue to threaten mankind or if they can be eliminated.

In view of these appeals and the wishes that are shared by millions, I think that it is on this first step, this first agreement that we should now concentrate our efforts. We know that the conclusion of a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water still meets the opposition of the Soviet delegation.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

But we refuse to believe that it will remain deaf to the appeals addressed to it to remove the danger of radiation. Nor will it wish to ignore the desires of the delegations of the non-aligned countries at this Conference. All these delegations have again and again urged the conclusion of an agreement putting an end to the most immediate danger of radioactivity. They support such a treaty, as they have clearly explained at recent meetings in statements which we have followed with the greatest interest. These delegations have also expressed the legitimate desire to reach broader and more concrete agreements, and we fully share this desire.

My delegation cannot accept the prospect of an uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests to which allusion has been made during recent debates. Such a moratorium corresponds neither to the spirit nor to the letter of the eight-Power memorandum. From the beginning the Italian delegation has supported the memorandum because it was and is convinced that this memorandum does not open the way to uncertain or dangerous situations such as would follow from an uncontrolled moratorium. To subordinate the conclusion of a treaty limited to those tests which are most dangerous for mankind to the acceptance of an uncontrolled moratorium for underground tests is typical of the fruitless attempts to go one better practised by the Soviet negotiators. The West has made concessions; it has not maintained an inflexible attitude. This evidence of its goodwill is certainly appreciated as such by the delegations here which wish to act as conciliators. This role would be frustrated if we were now asked to accept fully and without reserve the Soviet proposals which have remained unchanged since the beginning of the Conference.

In my opinion, all the delegations, both here and before long at the United Nations, should concentrate on what is feasible, on drawing up a preliminary agreement of great moral and political value in conformity with the desires of the peoples of the world. If we unite our efforts for peace we shall certainly achieve positive results.

It is with this appeal addressed to all, and particularly to the delegations of the non-aligned countries which are justly so keenly aware of the dangers of atmospheric contamination, that I wish to close my statement, hoping that common sense and the desire for peace will finally overcome all difficulties both in the field of tests and in that of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today we meet in this council chamber of a great palace dedicated to the great ideas of mankind. This room is decorated with symbolic panels of the great Spanish muralist Sert depicting the great struggle of the world for peace and freedom. In front of me I can see the symbolism of Abraham Lincoln reading the emancipation proclamation freeing the slaves; on my right I can see the symbolism of the progress of transportation, the harnessing of oxen or even human beings to haul great objects; in the upper right I can see the symbolism of one of the great twentieth century trains crossing a bridge, and on my right is the great symbolism of disarmament, the men from the wars returning to their families and a baby being held up on the guns as a symbol of a peaceful future; in the ceiling are the five continents spreading forth their hands in peace, and the tower of the great Spanish university of Salamanca and the faculties there engaged in the advancement of learning.

Shortly we shall, or many of us will, assemble again in another palace over 3,000 miles away. There we shall talk again of our ideas for solving the problems that stand in the way of a world without war in which States can develop their societies in their own ways and without interference from others. And within a few weeks we shall all, I trust, be back in this Council chamber renewed and refreshed to reflect upon all that has transpired. I am referring, of course, to our recess, to our forthcoming debates in the United Nations General Assembly, and to our return to concentrated efforts in this beautiful city that is our gracious host, to efforts of vital importance to our fellow men.

Our duty is indeed awesome, our responsibility supreme -- to safeguard the future of civilization and culture, the precious heritage we have received from our ancestors. That is the very essence of our Conference -- the great endeavour to allow men to continue their daily human existence, to be their brother's keeper, to disentangle themselves from the coils of national suspicion and prejudice, and to provide that the unique and precious gift of life will surely go on to our children and our children's children.

Can any of us doubt that we are grappling with the very problem of the life and death of the world as we all know it? We are not the first to do so, nor shall we, even if successful, be the last, for each new period of history unfolds its own problems and conflicts. Can anyone believe that we are not truly standing at one of the cross-roads of human destiny? Is there indeed any answer other than the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

determination to re-assert our will to survive in an unarmed world? Disarmament and the cessation of nuclear testing cannot, by themselves, create the world that we want. But only the ending of the arms race can create the climate in which fundamental progress of mankind is possible. Whether it be a decade of development for the developing countries of the world, man's increase of knowledge, the triumph of science over disease, or the conquest of the endless reaches of space, the cessation of nuclear testing and disarmament are now keys to that progress.

Can it be that some of us here fail to understand that? No, that I cannot imagine. Can it be that some of our Governments, our chiefs of State, are unaware of the dangers of disaster that accompany our every day? That, too, would seem incredible; the public record is replete with assertions to the contrary from men occupying the highest positions of public power.

And yet, here we sit. And here we have sat through almost five months of discussions on disarmament, and some of us for almost four years striving to ban nuclear tests, without achieving the actual break-through agreement that will start us on the road towards world security and peaceful pursuits. We who have been charged with the task of confining the age-old predatory and warlike instincts of men have, as yet, been unable ourselves to escape from the outdated instincts and emotions of our own backgrounds.

But let no one say that we have done nothing since 14 March, 1962, the day of our first meeting. The eighty-one plenary meetings that have followed, plus the meetings of the Sub-Committee on nuclear testing, the co-Chairmen's meetings, and meetings of the Committee of the Whole, have exposed full well the formulas for survival advanced by what are unfortunately the chief protagonists, the Soviet Union and the United States. Each of us has presented our plan for general and complete disarmament. We have all agreed that we must disarm. But we are not yet agreed on the methods or the means; we reach no accord on how fast, in what sequence, with what guarantees or verification, and with which substitutes for armaments, in other words, with what machinery to maintain the peace.

Of course, we have thought and expounded in depth and as we have expounded we have clarified our thinking and the problems. Each side understands with better precision the position of the other, the areas of possible negotiation, and the areas of momentarily irreconcilable differences. And for this we thank all the delegations, who have worked hard and diligently here to elucidate the issues and to ask

(Mr. Dean, United States)

penetrating questions. The two co-Chairmen are grateful, and, I venture to say, we have tried, each in our own way, to penetrate to the essence of the problems that stand before us and to their solution.

But where does that leave us? What are we to do with the nuclear weapons, the delivery vehicles for such weapons, the men in uniform and under arms, the familiar conventional weapons of the Second World War and their successors, the great developmental laboratories, military production plants and military bases, nuclear tests, and the use of outer space for military purposes? The United States has given its answer. Building on the outline President Kennedy presented to the United Nations on 25 September last year, General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, I have presented the way in which my country thinks that we can realistically proceed to our goal of general and complete disarmament. Our premise has been that we must follow a route to our objective which accords not merely with our own national interests, but carefully and objectively with those of our fellow men who belong to other sovereign States. We want to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament by means which expose us and our partners and the peace of the world to as few risks as possible.

We eschew any plans and programmes which seem to us to offer unilateral advantage, as well as those which provide deceptively easy but unrealistic answers. We earnestly try to take account of the problems of others, as well as our own. Admittedly, this is not easy, and we do not pretend to have achieved perfection. We have, however, offered to our colleagues around this table a programme of action which, in our view, is in harmony with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of September 1961, on which I worked with Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin, and which could not operate to the disadvantage of any nation.

Our proposals for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world are for balanced and equitable substantial reductions across the board of all aspects of military power, for a reasonable division of disarmament steps throughout three stages, for a sensible and progressive application of verification and control measures, and for agreement on confidence-building arrangements, including increasing the effectiveness of international peace-keeping procedures. The United States has made changes in its disarmament plan as a result of further analysis and of suggestions made by the States represented on this Committee, and we thank those

(Mr. Dean, United States)

representatives who have helped us in making these amendments. These changes concerned the important matters of transition and limiting the production of armaments.

We have listened with the greatest attention to the statements of all other delegations and we wish to thank all of them for their very helpful and constructive suggestions. We have reflected carefully upon the arguments of those who deeply disagree with us and whose basic ideals are so often opposite to our own. We have worked hard and long to discover possible paths of reconciliation because we know that only mutual agreements can bring to mankind security from war. And we are continuing to study and examine the many issues which confront us in an attempt to find some common areas of agreement.

In the broad perspective of history nothing will be more meaningless and shallow than tactical victories in terms of successful debating points. There can be no successful debating points. And yet, with all this, we cannot in all honesty see the merit of the Soviet proposals.

We cannot see how the draft disarmament treaty of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2 and Add.1) leads in three stages to balanced and approximately equal disarmament measures. After earnest study we fail to understand how the measures in that plan can be adequately verified. We are unable to comprehend how they would contribute to healthy and viable international political relationships as we move from the present world, where armaments are increasing at an accelerating pace, to our goal of a planet devoid of armaments except for the minimum amount needed for the maintenance of international security by a United Nations peace force. In short, it is beyond us to see how the plans which the Soviet Union advocates so ardently will help to prepare the way to a peaceful world of the future in which the dangers of human strife will cede place to the opportunities of global collaboration.

A continuing dialogue on the details of a treaty for general and complete disarmament is only part of our task. We also have the heavy responsibility of reaching agreements which can be implemented at the earliest possible time. Such agreements could include initial measures and they could also encompass several disarmament items representing the widest area of agreement. We cannot, indeed we dare not, go on for years without demonstrating tangible, specific and meaningful progress.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Our attention has focussed in these past several weeks on an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests. The United Kingdom and the United States, with the approval of Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy, have made major moves during this period. We have brought our scientists to Geneva to discuss new research findings bearing on the detection, location and identification of tests. We have submitted a new treaty (ENDC/58) to ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time, based on the results of our research and also on the 16 April 1962 memorandum of the eight new members of this Committee, which we have found most helpful. Finally, in an effort to reach agreement, we have submitted a treaty covering a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/59).

On the comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, the principal issue which divides us from the Soviet delegation is the matter of on-site inspection. As representatives are aware, we have outlined in our draft comprehensive treaty certain scientific criteria, and we have suggested to the Soviet delegation that if those scientific criteria are not adequate, or if our Soviet colleagues find anything wrong with those criteria, they should submit to us their idea of the scientific criteria which should be put into the treaty. I have outlined recently to my Soviet colleague, in connexion with the certification procedure regarding an unidentified event to be followed by the international commission set up under our comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58) a provision that if the commission should fail to come to a definite conclusion as to the nature of an event it could review the case in consultation, if necessary, with a panel of internationally eminent nuclear scientists or seismologists and also, if necessary, with representatives of the Government on whose territory the unidentified event has occurred. And only after those means of evaluation and careful and painstaking scientific consultations had been exhausted would an event be certified as eligible for on-site inspection, if doubts about its true nature could not be resolved otherwise. I have then wondered, with the representative of the Soviet Union, if, given such a careful scientific procedure, we could then agree that the parties to the treaty "shall" invite inspections on their territory by the commission. Unfortunately, however, this question of obligatory on-site inspection is still associated in the minds of our Soviet colleagues with espionage or intelligence, and so far we have not been able to bridge what I might describe as the grammatical gap; that is, we have not been able to bridge the gap between the word "could" and the word "shall". But we plan

(Mr. Dean, United States)

to continue with our system of education with our Soviet colleagues, who have been most helpful and patient, and we continue to hope that this question of obligatory on-site inspection will be worked out and will be accepted by all of the parties as a necessary part of the verification system of a comprehensive test ban treaty. And, parenthetically, I might inform the Conference, with the approval of my Soviet and United Kingdom colleagues, that we have tentatively agreed that the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests during the recess will be held in Geneva next Wednesday, with the express understanding, however, that that date may be changed by agreement of the three parties.

On the limited treaty to ban all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space the only issue which divides us is the insistence on the part of the Soviet Union that there be an uninspected and unverifiable moratorium on underground tests. We are asked, or so it seems to us, in essence to have a comprehensive treaty with no verification machinery under the guise of a limited treaty, and with it absolutely no indication that a real comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments with effective verification will ever come into existence. The United States regrets that it cannot accept what we regard as an unreasonable Soviet request in this respect.

The United Kingdom and the United States, as I have said, have made these major moves within the past month. Since we must continue to negotiate we must now have corresponding moves on the part of our Soviet colleagues. But the Soviet Union has made no moves since the United Kingdom-United States treaties were introduced. If the Soviet Union has decided, as indeed I hope it has, that it wants a test ban treaty by 1 January 1963, then it must soon move in the direction of reaching agreement. Among sovereign States, movement is the very essence of negotiation.

There are other initial measures and areas of disarmament in which agreement ought to be possible. We should in our respective capitals seek out and formulate proposals for such measures. We must demonstrate that we do indeed want to stop the arms race. Here, the only proof is the reaching and implementation of agreements.

Our recess will be a time of searching examination, and each of us will be put to the test. Those of us who go to New York will be measured by the degree of constructive spirit reflected in our words at the General Assembly. Those of us who return to our respective capitals will be judged, after 12 November next, by the utility of the approach taken by each delegation to disarmament questions in moving us toward our goal.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

And last, but not least, those of us who remain in Geneva to grapple with the elusive prize of a nuclear test ban treaty will stand or fall in the light of what we accomplish in the next two months.

Will we be able to locate the tortuous trail of mutual accommodation and international responsibility? Will we be able to take the small and yet giant first step toward agreement in the whole area of disarmament? I sincerely hope so, but I cannot answer those questions now, and I cannot predict the prospects of our Conference.

I can only pose some questions and set forth, to the best of my ability, my obligations, as I see them, to my Government, my countrymen, to you, as my fellow Conference members, and, above all, to my fellow human beings.

My delegation and my Government will endeavour in the utmost good faith to pursue our objectives both during and after the impending recess.

Let me conclude my remarks with a special appeal to my Soviet colleagues. Disarmament is a substitute way of maintaining the national security of a State. It is a radical substitute for a national security system based on armaments which have taken years to acquire and to which, unfortunately, nations have become accustomed. My first appeal, therefore, is that our Soviet colleagues should join with us to change the deep-rooted idea that armaments today can bring security. It is our duty, our mutual duty, to prove to the sceptics that they are wrong. Steps to halt the arms race must be taken soon before the will to do so degenerates into despair.

My second appeal is that we must achieve agreements even though we cannot resolve all the political disputes now dividing us. The disputes must not be used as the excuse for postponing agreement, and they must not be used as the excuse for wrecking any progress or agreements realized. Our world must find ways to resolve disputes and to allow for change in international relations by peaceful means where this is necessary, without the traditional resort to the threat of war or to actual war itself.

My third appeal to the Soviet Union concerns its policy of secrecy. Disarmament and secrecy I submit are incompatible. The United States recognizes that secrecy has been a part of Russian society and of Russian life for many, many years. It is almost the only country today where secrecy is such an important part

(Mr. Dean, United States)

of the life of a nation. But secrecy does indeed breed distrust. Somehow the Soviet Union must find a way to reassure the world instead of hiding from it. Otherwise substantial disarmament will not be possible. The United States, for its part, will seek to take those steps to encourage openness and not secrecy on the part of the Soviet Union.

It is these thoughts that I wanted to make at our closing meeting and just before we make our second interim progress report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

If we can summon a common, supreme dedication by all of us in the next months to overcome many of the disarmament issues now dividing us we may yet see the day when we shall beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning hooks. We must destroy arms together before arms destroy us altogether.

And, in closing, I would again like to express my appreciation to my distinguished co-Chairman for his helpful, patient, and constructive work and for his attitude towards our work and to thank all of my colleagues here at the Conference for their patience in listening to these long lectures.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today, before the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament goes into recess, the Soviet delegation, like other delegations, considers it appropriate to express its views on the course of the negotiations.

Since the first day of its work, the Committee has had fixed upon it the gaze of all the peoples, whose most cherished hope is to be delivered from the impending threat of a destructive thermonuclear war. The peoples rightly regard general and complete disarmament as a realistic way towards consolidating peace and creating the conditions for a peaceful life on our planet -- without weapons and without wars. In our age -- the age of social progress of unprecedented rapidity, of scientific and technical discoveries of the greatest importance and of man's daring and systematic penetration into outer space -- the time has come to put an end to devastating wars between States. For this purpose it is necessary to carry out disarmament, and the United Nations General Assembly has given the Eighteen Nation Committee a clear and unambiguous mandate -- to reach agreement as soon as possible on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Half a year has now gone by. The Committee has held more than eighty plenary meetings, and other work has been done by its subsidiary bodies -- the Committee of the Whole and the three-Power Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. About 700 statements, amounting in all to nearly one and a half million words, have been made at the meetings by participants in the negotiations. In the United Nations archives new shelves have appeared, stacked with the proceedings, verbatim records and other documents of the Eighteen Nation Committee.

And what are the results of the Committee's work over the past months? How far have the negotiations taken mankind forward towards that great objective which the times imperiously dictate -- general and complete disarmament? If one filters the sea of words which have been uttered here, if one picks out the grains of reason from the heap of Committee documents, then unfortunately one will find that very little has been achieved. The preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament has been drafted (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1 and ENDC/42), and agreement has been reached on particular provisions of a most general nature, which do not as yet define how general and complete disarmament is to be carried out in practice.

But the main and fundamental problems of disarmament are still unsettled, and the positions of the sides on these problems have not moved closer together. Not even a thin slat has been laid across the deep gulf of disagreement. We are bound to say that today we are no nearer to agreement on general and complete disarmament than we were on the day when negotiations began.

As you see, the Committee cannot boast of the results it has achieved. This is an unpleasant truth, but it is the truth all the same. Any other appraisal could lead only to unjustified illusions, and thus weaken the vigilance of the peoples who are demanding the speediest possible practical solution of the disarmament problem.

But what has prevented, and what is still preventing, the Eighteen Nation Committee from making progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament? An answer must be given to this question. Since the struggle for general and complete disarmament is not only not coming to an end, but will be continued on an ever increasing scale and with ever greater intensity, it is important to understand clearly what is the essence of the disagreements, and where one can look for a way out of the situation which has arisen.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Everyone now recognizes that the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war, and war in general, can only be solved by means of general and complete disarmament, and by the complete elimination of the armed forces and armaments of States. In our time this means first and foremost that it is necessary to eliminate the weapons and means for waging a thermonuclear war, which is the most terrible threat in the whole history of mankind. That is what the peoples are demanding; and it is from that standpoint that we must evaluate the proposals which have been submitted for the Committee's consideration.

The Soviet Union, with the support of other socialist States, has submitted for the Committee's consideration some proposals which ensure the complete and rapid solution of the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war. Our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2 and Add.1) contains clear and precise provisions for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and all other types of weapons of mass destruction. In complete accordance with the wishes and hopes of the peoples, this draft is based on the principle that as early as the first stage, at the very beginning of the disarmament process, steps should be taken which would practically eliminate the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war. Our draft treaty proposes that disarmament should be started with the complete elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the elimination of all foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those territories. Other disarmament measures to ensure the complete elimination of the war machines of States are also envisaged in our draft.

The consistent position of principle adopted by the socialist States in the struggle for the liberation of mankind from the threat of war and for a stable peace stems from the very nature of the socialist system, in which there is no place for social groups which are interested in the armaments race and in pursuing an aggressive policy.

In the course of the negotiations the Soviet Union has spared no effort to make it easier for the positions to come closer together and to work out a common approach to disarmament measures. In every proposal which has been put forward by this or that delegation, we have tried to see what is useful and likely

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

to contribute to the achievement of this objective. Showing goodwill and readiness to seek for mutually acceptable solutions, the Soviet Government agreed to accept the procedure proposed by the United States for the reduction of conventional armaments, put forward a compromise proposal on the level of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States by the end of the first stage, and declared its readiness to carry out in the first stage measures to reduce the risk of war, and to extend the overall period for the completion of all disarmament measures and, in particular, the measures of the first stage.

Taking into account the wishes expressed in and outside the Committee, the Soviet Government has declared that it is prepared -- if the Western Powers are agreeable to this -- to transfer from the second stage to the first such nuclear disarmament measures as the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of their production.

It goes without saying that, while carefully weighing the proposals, comments and views put forward by participants in the negotiations, and while considering to what extent these proposals can be taken into account in the disarmament programme, the Soviet Union has invariably been guided, and continues to be guided, by the consideration that it is essential not to lose sight of the main objective -- not to allow the programme of general and complete disarmament to become emasculated or deprived of its essential content.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the representatives of the non-aligned countries participating in the Committee have, during the course of the negotiations, stressed the need for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and have expressed themselves in favour of taking bold steps, right from the very beginning of the disarmament process, to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. These countries, which do not form part of military blocs, are not -- as they say themselves -- seeking neutrality between war and peace, but desire to make their contribution to the victory of peace over war.

One can say that if all participants in the Committee's work had had the same sincere desire to reach agreement on the fundamental problems of general and complete disarmament, then the negotiations would by now have made great headway, and in any case the outlines of an agreement would now have been laid down.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

We must note, however, that the representatives of the Western Powers, and in the first place the United States of America, have adopted a different position in the negotiations.

What have the Western Powers put forward for the Committee's consideration? The United States has submitted for consideration by the Committee a plan (ENDC/30, Corr.1, Add.1 and 2) which does not lead to general and complete disarmament or the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, and which fails in this important respect to meet the demands of millions of people.

The United States plan does not provide for the prohibition of nuclear weapons; and during the negotiations the Western Powers have made no secret of the fact that they intend to preserve these weapons of mass destruction, under the pretext of equipping with these weapons the international armed force which it is proposed to establish in connexion with the implementation of general and complete disarmament. In the United States plan there are no realistic measures aimed at lessening, at least to any considerable extent, the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe right from the start.

There are profound differences, too, between the positions of the sides on the question of ensuring the security of States during the disarmament process.

The Soviet proposals, in strict compliance with the agreed principles for negotiations on disarmament (ENDC/5), are based on the premise that no State or group of States should at any stage gain a military advantage, and that equal security should be ensured for all. Thus, in the first stage of our draft treaty provides for the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories. This means that the Soviet Union, which, as is generally acknowledged, possesses the most powerful global and inter-continental rockets, is prepared voluntarily to surrender this very substantial military advantage, but, with complete justification, it is entitled, on its part, to demand that the Western Powers should agree to the elimination of all military bases on alien territories, and to the withdrawal of their troops from such territories. This is the only approach which would ensure equality in regard to the security of both sides.

But how do the Western Powers approach this question? The United States plan would have the result that from the very beginning the defence capability of the Soviet Union would be seriously undermined owing to a reduction in the

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

number of inter-continental and global rockets, which are by far the most reliable defensive weapons we have, while all United States bases on alien territory, which have been established not for the purposes of defence but for aggression against peace-loving States, would remain intact. Is it not clear that this would prejudice the security interests of the other side, while securing important military advantages for the Western Powers?

This line, aimed at obtaining for the Western Powers unilateral military advantages over the Soviet Union, showed up also in their proposals regarding control. From the first to the last paragraph, the United States plan is imbued with the desire to achieve the establishment of control over the armed forces and armaments of States, in particular in the form of so-called selective zonal inspection. But what does this mean, and to whose advantage would it be in present-day conditions? It would be only to the advantage of a potential aggressor, since he is just the one who is interested in obtaining intelligence data on the defence system of the other side and on the location of vitally important objectives in its territory. This can only be needed for the working out of military plans, especially for determining the targets for nuclear attacks, about which certain circles in the West make no secret.

That is why the Soviet Government, which has consistently advocated the establishment of effective international control over all disarmament measures, resolutely opposes any attempts to impose control in the form of selective zonal inspection.

An analysis of the proposals of the Western Powers and their attitude in the Committee shows that these Powers are evidently not yet ready to seek in a businesslike manner a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and prefer to engage merely in talk about disarmament. One gets the impression that by means of such talk they count on diverting attention from their dangerous policy aimed at ever greater acceleration of the nuclear armaments race, which they have now extended into outer space as well.

No matter how much the Western Powers have tried to isolate the Committee from the outside world, to keep it, as it were, under hothouse conditions in this Conference room in the Palais des Nations, the wind of events occurring in the world has nevertheless been bursting into the conference room every day. There is no escape from the realities of life. It is impossible to conceal the fact

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

that, while the representatives of the Western Powers have been assuring us here of their Governments' concern for peace, disarmament and the successful outcome of the negotiations, outside the walls of this Committee the United States of America and its allies in aggressive military blocs have been taking further steps one after the other in the direction of preparing for war, thus intensifying the arms race.

That is where we find the deep roots underlying the fact that the difference between the sides on the question of general and complete disarmament remain unsurmounted and no progress is being made in the work of the Committee!

Despite all the efforts of the peace-loving States, it has also proved impossible to make any headway in the negotiations in the Committee in solving the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. These efforts continue to be defeated by the rigid, uncompromising attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom. By putting forward unrealistic and utterly uncalled-for terms of an agreement, the Western Powers obviously wish to keep their hands free for the continuation of nuclear test explosions, for the further improvement of their weapons of mass destruction.

In a unanimous impulse the peoples of the whole world demand that an end should be put to all nuclear weapon tests, that the pollution of the atmosphere, the depths of the earth, the waters of the oceans and the seas through radioactive fallout should be stopped and the arms race brought to a halt, thus facilitating the achievement of an agreement on the main question -- the question of general and complete disarmament. At the present time all the necessary conditions exist, provided the sides are willing, for solving once and for all the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests with the establishment of strict control over compliance by States with their obligations through the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union is prepared to conclude forthwith on this basis an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests.

But the Western Powers refuse to adopt a realistic position and do not want to take the path of mutually acceptable solutions in this matter either. Nor do they agree to accept as the basis for negotiations the compromise proposals on the cessation of tests which were submitted by eight States members of the Committee on 16 April (ENDC/28) and which provide a good way out of the existing situation.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

On the Western Powers and on them alone depends the possibility of reaching a partial agreement on the cessation of tests, which would provide for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, while negotiations on the prohibition of underground tests would be continued and the States would assume an obligation not to carry out underground tests during such negotiations.

In the very near future the problem of general and complete disarmament and the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests will be considered at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The discussion of disarmament questions in the highest and most representative international forum should, as we hope, be of appreciable value and give a new impetus to the ideas and actions of the representatives in the Eighteen Nation Committee. We shall be sincerely glad if the discussions at the United Nations General Assembly instigate the United States and other Western Powers to show in deeds their readiness to find a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. Otherwise it will be impossible to count on success in the negotiations, and the hopes of the peoples for a lasting peace will be crushed.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will, as before, make tireless efforts to achieve practical results in the struggle for disarmament and show its willingness to engage in businesslike negotiations, but it will remain relentlessly opposed to everything that hinders a solution of the disarmament problem.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, said on 10 July 1962, at the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace:

"General and complete disarmament would ring in a truly historic change in men's lives, the change from the epoch of wars to the epoch of lasting peace on earth. This historic change can come true. It must come true!" (ENDC/47, p.31)

The Soviet Union, for its part, will do its utmost to ensure that the historic change from a nuclear arms race to general and complete disarmament becomes a fact.

Now I should like to make a few further comments in view of the fact that today is the last meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I should like to express my gratitude to my co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, for his co-operation and the great efforts he has made to enable the work of the two co-Chairmen to take place in a businesslike and frank atmosphere. He has represented his country with dignity. For my part I should like to say that the Soviet delegation has also done its best to make the work of the Committee fruitful. Evidently we have not been sufficiently experienced propagandists of the Soviet Union's position, since we have been unable to convince Mr. Dean of the soundness of our position.

We shall keep on trying to convince him.

Now I should like to express on behalf of the Soviet delegation our thanks to the special representative of the Acting Secretary-General, Mr. Loutfi, who is unfortunately not with us today, and to his Deputy, Mr. Epstein.

I should also like to express our gratitude to all the members of the United Nations Secretariat who have made great efforts to ensure the necessary conditions for the work of the Committee. We should like to note the accurate and irreproachable work of the staff. If the results of our work do not amount to much, it is not the fault of the staff. We should like to thank, in particular, the interpreters to whom we gave a good deal of trouble, even though we tried to speak slowly and distinctly. But we did not always succeed in doing so. However, the interpreters coped with their task very well and were never at a loss in any situation.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania): When speaking about the main task of this Conference -- general and complete disarmament -- we must always bear in mind that this is one of the greatest common undertakings of mankind. It is a huge enterprise aimed at turning the world as it has existed up to our time -- an armed world, possessing and threatened by an unprecedented power of destruction -- into a world without arms, without war, without the warlike mentality. In that era, as Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, pointed out:

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

"People will utilize to the full our planet's resources as well as those of their own inventive power in order to create a world from which stagnation, poverty and hunger will be eliminated for ever, while peaceful understanding and fruitful co-operation and friendship between countries and peoples will flourish."

In order to accomplish this gigantic task one has to resort to the deepest springs of determination, courage and vision. Science and its achievements reinforce our conviction that this task is feasible, and support the idea of taking decisive steps in this direction. Science deletes the word "impossible", making what yesterday appeared to be still a Utopian dream the palpable truth today.

Now, after five months of activity, it is our duty to ask ourselves whether we have resorted to every means at our disposal and whether every avenue has been explored in order to advance our work on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At the same time, facing the unsatisfactory results, we have to ask ourselves what are the causes of the stagnation in our work.

The Romanian delegation, together with the other delegations from the socialist countries, supported the realistic and efficient measures embodied in the Soviet draft treaty and has spared no effort in order to promote the cause of general and complete disarmament. In our view, the principal criterion for appraising the efficiency of a disarmament plan is the extent to which it tends to eliminate the very possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The Soviet proposals satisfy that criterion. They satisfy it in providing for the liquidation within the framework of stage I of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles simultaneously with the liquidation of military bases located on foreign territory. They satisfy this criterion all the more today since the Soviet Government has expressed its readiness for all disarmament measures aimed at preventing a nuclear war to be fully implemented during stage I, and accordingly to have the totality of the measures covering the liquidation of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and the cessation of production, transferred from the second to the first stage. Such proposals can lead to our goal. Time is running out. We must abandon the snail's pace in this era of cosmic flights. The removal of the unprecedented threat hanging over mankind calls for drastic measures. General and complete disarmament implies the adoption of radical measures of a

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

kind to effect qualitative changes in the prevailing situation, not palliatives consisting of just reducing some cumbersome weapon stockpiles.

While acknowledging the deep sense of responsibility which found expression during our proceedings -- and we are happy to emphasize the positive contribution made by the eight non-aligned countries represented here -- we must note that the stand taken by the Western Powers represented an obstacle in the way of reaching agreement. There could be no better proof of that than the position of the Western delegations with regard to what constitutes the core of the matter -- that is, the necessity for eliminating the danger of nuclear war in the very first stage of disarmament. Whereas the delegations from the socialist countries have responded to this vital aspiration of all peoples in their proposals, the Western delegations refuse to adopt the necessary measures, thus perpetuating the nuclear threat throughout the whole disarmament process and even after what they consider to be its completion. At the same time, the delegations from the socialist countries have shown their readiness to negotiate in good faith and to meet the position of the other side halfway, without trying to obtain military advantages for themselves. But the delegations of the United States and its allies seem to have a fixed preoccupation with ensuring military advantages for themselves in all the measures proposed. How else can one explain their preoccupation with securing, through inspection measures, footholds on the territory of the other party and uncovering, while there still remains the danger of aggression, the defence system of the other side?

Another example in this connexion is offered by the problem of military bases located on foreign territory -- those hotbeds of war which are scattered all over our planet and which the United States wants to maintain on the map of a world which lays down its arms and must become a world of peace. These preoccupations are fully consonant with and are explained by the increase in the military organization and the disquieting speed-up in the arms race spiral, converging towards the breaking point. Never before in peacetime has the military budget of the United States reached such a level as today, while we are debating disarmament.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

As far as the Romanian delegation is concerned -- and we think we share the views of many other delegation -- we continue to believe in the possibility of reaching agreement on the substantial matters before us. For that purpose it is to be desired that, the Western governments will listen to the voice of reason, change their position and approach the negotiations in a new spirit -- a spirit appropriate to the task of building a world free from war. If those requirements are met it will be possible not only to advance rapidly towards general and complete disarmament but also to reach agreement on such urgent measures as the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones -- measures intended to lessen international tension and to promote confidence in international relations.

How beneficial such a change of attitude would be for the solution of today's problems can easily be understood if we bear in mind the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. There exists an objective possibility of reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for ever. That possibility is reflected in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) the eight Power memorandum submitted to this Conference on 16 April (ENDC/28) and other proposals, such as that concerning the fixing of a target date for the cessation of all tests. Here, too, the solution depends on the position of the Western nuclear Powers, who have to give up their unjustified conditions which do not promote but on the contrary deter agreement. The Romanian delegation, acting on the instructions of its Government, whose policy reflects the deepest aspiration for peace of the Romanian people, wants to state its readiness to support any constructive proposal leading to efficient agreement. World peace calls for efforts to be made by all States, whether big or small. Conscious of its duty to make its contribution to international détente, the Romanian Government proposed in 1957 and permanently strives for measures for the creation of a zone of peace and co-operation in the Balkans. During the proceedings of the Committee we again repeated our appeals aiming at the conclusion of a treaty of mutual understanding and collective security in this area, to turn the Balkans into a zone of peace without nuclear weapons and rockets, into a zone of friendship and co-operation for the benefit of all the peoples in this part of the world.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

We are forwarding today a report to the United Nations. We are addressing it equally to all men anxious to see removed the threat of war which hangs over mankind as well as over the younger generation which has to be brought up in the spirit of peace, understanding and mutual respect between peoples. We have not succeeded so far; we must do better. We are now ending a stage of our work, but in our efforts, in our endeavours aimed at taking new steps towards general and complete disarmament there must be no recess.

The Romanian delegation wants to express its thanks to our co-Chairmen for their patient and hard work, to express our sincere thanks to the representatives of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to all the other members of the staff, visible and invisible, without exception, who, by their skilled efforts, have made our work possible. My delegation extends to one and all the expression of its gratitude and appreciation.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I want to make a short statement this morning on item 5(d) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52), namely, measures in the field of nuclear disarmament together with appropriate measures of control. It is, of course, self-evident that it is not possible to have any serious discussion before the recess of this, in our view one of the most important of all problems facing this Committee.

However, item 5(d) was raised at our last meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, who, in the course of his remarks, expressed his Government's readiness:

"... to transfer all measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and cessation of production, from the second stage to the first." (ENDC/PV.81, p.15)

In view of Mr. Kuznetsov's remarks, I have certain observations to make today on this subject. We are all agreed, I believe, that nuclear weapons are militarily the most important in the world today. If we could come to some agreement on nuclear weapons I am sure that we would have less difficulty with other aspects of disarmament. We have recently had further discussions on nuclear delivery vehicles, which constitute one component of a nuclear weapons system. I think we can now take it as having been amply shown that no attempt to verify the elimination of a nuclear weapons system by

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

concentrating on the nuclear delivery vehicles alone --- I say on the delivery vehicles alone --- is likely to succeed. No. The truth is that if we are to control nuclear weapons completely we must go for the fissile material for the warheads.

What is it that distinguishes a nuclear weapon from all other weapons? Is it the rocket which carries it, or the gun or the submarine? No. All these can carry and deliver conventional warheads. The thing which is unique to a nuclear weapon is its warhead. And what is there in a nuclear warhead that is found in no other weapons? Is it the electronics or the conventional explosive which triggers it all off? No. It is the fissile material in the warhead; that is to say, the plutonium and uranium-235, the two fissile materials now most commonly used in nuclear weapons. If we are to deal effectively with nuclear weapons we must concentrate on the fissile material which every nuclear weapon has and which no other weapon has.

My colleagues will recall that Mr. Godber discussed this problem in some detail on 6 June (ENDC/PV.50). He pointed out that there were three aspects of the nuclear warhead problem which were, naming the most dangerous first, (a) illicitly concealed fissile materials or nuclear warheads; (b) diversion of fissile material from permitted current production; and (c) seizure of stocks of fissile materials held for civil purposes. As the Committee are aware, my Government has for some time been concerned about certain problems implicit in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. When we knew that nuclear power would be used for generating electricity on a large scale, we initiated a thorough study of how we could ensure that this new technical advance did not become a danger to the peace of the world. My Government takes its responsibility in this matter particularly seriously because the United Kingdom will soon be perhaps the largest producer of plutonium in the world and certainly the largest civil producer. We therefore carried out extensive studies, both theoretical and practical, over a period of some six years, to try and find out how serious these problems could be. The results of these studies were combined in the technical paper which my delegation circulated as a Conference document to the Committee at our seventy-seventh meeting. This document is ENDC/60, "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production."

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

My colleagues will have seen that this paper begins with a study of the factors which determine the degree of accuracy with which one can account for the production of fissile materials in permitted plants. The authors of the paper adopted this approach because it is only when we have found out what we can and cannot do by way of accounting for fissile material from current production that we can study the more difficult and, in our view, the more dangerous problem of accounting for the past production of fissile material. This problem is dealt with in the second part of the paper, and the conclusions reached are, of course, directly relevant to the problem of concealed nuclear warheads and concealed fissile material. We believe that the only way of being certain that there are no concealed stocks of fissile material and, therefore, no nuclear warheads, is to be able to account for, and to prove that we can account for, all stocks of fissile material produced in the world. If that is not done, then, clearly, people will not be convinced that someone may not have kept back either nuclear warheads or, equally dangerous, the fissile material needed to make them. In such a situation no nuclear Power would have any adequate assurance that other nuclear Powers had not concealed nuclear weapons; and I surely need not underline how dangerous these weapons are. It is not difficult to imagine how fragile international confidence would be in such a case.

I do not propose this morning to take up the Committee's time by going through now the paper's technical arguments in detail. However, I should like briefly to draw attention to its main conclusions. These are set out in paragraphs 64 to 75 of document ENDC/60 and they treat the two fissile materials used in making warheads --- plutonium and uranium-235 --- separately.

As regards current production, the paper reaches the conclusion that such production could probably be accounted for to between one and two per cent for plutonium and within one per cent for uranium-235.

As regards past production, the paper reaches the conclusion that a control organization could not guarantee the complete accuracy of its accounting for past production of fissile material. In the case of the past production of plutonium, the margin of uncertainty would be up to some 10 to 15 per cent. In the case of the past production of uranium-235, the margin of uncertainty would be up to some 15 to 20 per cent. However, if it could be proved that the records of electricity

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

supplies to diffusion plants had not been falsified, this margin of uncertainty could be reduced to some 5 to 10 per cent.

In view of these uncertainties, however, the net result is that a control organization could not, by production accounting, guarantee that up to 10 to 20 per cent of stocks of nuclear weapons assembled by any given country from past fissile material production had not been concealed.

At first sight, these conclusions are admittedly depressing. But let me add that the analysis in our paper is based on figures relating only to the United Kingdom. We do not know, and we have not tried to assess, how accurately it would be possible to account for other countries' fissile material production. We cannot therefore say whether our facts and figures and, of course, the conclusions based on them, would necessarily apply to other countries.

We shall therefore be most interested to learn in due course whether our colleagues would agree that the analysis and conclusions of our paper are generally valid. However, I suspect that there is less dispute over the technical facts --- and their relevance --- in this field than in some others which we have been discussing. I should like to remind the Committee that in this connexion the Soviet Government has already placed itself clearly on the record. Allow me to quote from the proposals presented by Mr. Malik on 10 May 1955 to the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee about the diversion of output:

"The greatest apprehensions exist among peace-loving peoples in connexion with the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in regard to which the institution of international control is particularly difficult.

"This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials and, moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that States having establishments for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons ..."

(DC/71, Annex 15; DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2, pp. 17-18)

The quotation goes on:

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

"Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise attack on peace-loving States." (ibid.)

Those were Mr. Malik's words at that time. I was therefore surprised at Mr. Kuznetsov's suggestion at our last meeting. Like Mr. Burns, I welcome evidence of flexibility. What surprised me was that Mr. Kuznetsov invited us to consider the possibility of eliminating wholly at the very beginning of the disarmament process precisely those weapons the complete elimination of which, as his Government admitted in the 1955 statement to which I have just referred, "is particularly difficult"; precisely those weapons in the case of which, as Mr. Malik said, "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control ... even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed."

Indeed, it struck me forcibly that Mr. Kuznetsov ignored three logical consequences which stem from his suggestion, namely:

(a) Stage I of the disarmament process, under the latest Soviet suggestion, would be so overloaded as to telescope into the impracticably short time of twenty-four months virtually all the most difficult measures of general and complete disarmament.

(b) As a result, effective measures of verification would have to be brought forward in time to correspond with the increased amount of weapons destruction proposed.

(c) The establishment of effective peace-keeping machinery would likewise have to be brought forward in time to complement fissile material verification which, as our paper shows, is unlikely to be 100 per cent satisfactory.

Now, as has already emerged in our discussions, those very same difficulties would be caused if the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles right at the beginning of the disarmament process were adopted. Mr. Kuznetsov's present proposal involves the same difficulties in an even more

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

challenging form. In both cases the Soviet proposals, by their timing, involve also a heavy security imbalance. This has already been discussed at length and I will not deal with that point further today. Indeed, for my part, what I want to do is to underline the conclusions to which our paper (ENDC/60) leads, conclusions which in our view point to the right way out of our difficulties and to the right solution of our problems.

First, it would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved unless corresponding measures of adequate verification had been agreed upon and were implemented pari passu. Indeed, to do otherwise would be a clear breach of the joint statement of agreed principles. Secondly, it would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved before some steps towards adequate peace-keeping arrangements had been made.

In this connexion, my colleagues may recall the analogy which I drew on 28 May of the three-legged stool --- the three legs being disarmament, verification and strengthened peace-keeping machinery. I suggested that "The stool cannot rest on one leg or on two legs only, it must rest on all three." (ENDC/PV.43, p.12)

Our task around this table, surely, is to achieve general and complete disarmament without prejudicing the security of individual States. No State can be expected to accept, as a direct result of disarmament, what it regards as a less reliable form of security than it enjoys at present. In building the organization of the disarmed world in which we plan to live, the creation of better peace-keeping arrangements is an absolutely essential part of the structure. This issue cannot, we believe, be burked. Moreover, the adequacy and reliability of those peace-keeping arrangements will depend upon a correct analysis by this Conference of the problems involved in nuclear disarmament, some of the most important of which are set out in our paper.

The Committee will no doubt agree that a great deal more discussion will be required in order to see how we can meet and resolve, in a way satisfactory to us all, the three problems --- for there are, in our view, three --- involved in nuclear disarmament, namely, the method and timing of the destruction of nuclear weapons, the verification of that destruction and the form of improved peace-keeping arrangements which must accompany them. That will be one of the major tasks awaiting us when we resume work here after the recess. I believe that all delegations will wish to give it hard thought against the day when we reconvene.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

That is what I wanted to say today. It only remains for me to associate myself with the tributes already paid by the representative of the Soviet Union and by other colleagues to the representative of the Secretary-General and to the staff of their organization who give us such invaluable help.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): The conclusion of the second part of our discussions here provides an opportunity for the Czechoslovak delegation also to review critically the results of our work. The Czechoslovak delegation wishes to identify itself with the view expressed here by many delegations that we have hardly any reason for satisfaction. If in June this year we criticized the results of the first part of our deliberations as giving us little reason for satisfaction, then that is all the more true of the second part of our talks. This conclusion may also be corroborated by the Committee's second report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission which has again a formal character.

It is true that during the past weeks discussion has continued in this conference room about general and complete disarmament, which discussion in itself is a positive fact, and that positions of the delegations on different problems were clarified in greater detail. Of course there were some small positive results in our work, to which the speakers who took the floor before me referred. However, all that is much too little. We have to expect, therefore, that at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly many delegations of States Members of the United Nations will express some dissatisfaction at the slow speed at which we have been moving forward and that they will urge us to accelerate our work.

In this connexion let us consider why the work of our Committee has again yielded such minimum results. We are fully aware that the negotiations on disarmament, which so vitally concern the security interests of States, are a very difficult matter requiring maximum goodwill and endeavour from all the participating countries in their search for mutually acceptable areas of agreement. However, time is not in favour of mankind. We have been witnessing continued nuclear armament which has been recently extended to outer space by the United States tests conducted at high altitude. Stockpiles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the total explosive power of which is today capable of more than destroying the entire globe, are increasing, also the danger arises that nuclear weapons might be acquired by

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

other States, which would further complicate the present situation. In this respect exceptionally great efforts are made by the militarist circles of the German Federal Republic.

Therefore the times categorically demand that maximum efforts be exerted towards reaching the earliest possible agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament and towards removing the danger of a nuclear war. That is the vital concern of all nations, which demand with increasing urgency that a decisive turn be made in disarmament discussions and lasting peace be secured throughout the world.

However, what do we witness? The course of the second part of the negotiations has once again made it clear that our partners from the NATO countries are still not willing to take, together with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the other socialist countries, decisive measures in the field of disarmament and, above all, measures aimed at the removal of the threat of a nuclear war. That was clearly proved during the consideration of the question of the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles. In our view the liquidation of such vehicles, together with the abolition of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops is the cardinal measure of stage I of the process of disarmament which would result in the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

And here we cannot agree with the representative of the United States who, on 3 September, alleged that "neither the Soviet plan nor the United States plan would achieve that aim." (ENDC/PV.79, p.16) Mr. Dean is absolutely right as far as the United States plan is concerned --- incidentally he merely confirmed what the socialist delegations have pointed out all the time here; but he is wrong when he says the same about the Soviet plan, failing, moreover, to substantiate his assertion.

The question we face today is whether to take from the beginning of the disarmament process bold and resolute steps going to the root of the danger of a nuclear war, as proposed by the Soviet Union, or to take small and practically formal steps which would not only not remove the danger of war but, when linked with the Western conception of control, would rather increase international tension and make a military conflict more probable. We wish to say quite frankly that we are in favour of the first alternative which is in harmony with the most vital

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

interests not only of the people of our own country but of all other countries as well. We wish to state once again that the position of the socialist countries is flexible. This is borne out by the offer made recently by the Soviet delegation, and repeated by it at our eighty-first meeting on 5 September, that the Soviet Union is prepared, if that were acceptable to the Western Powers to agree to total liquidation of all stocks of nuclear weapons as early as possible in stage I of general and complete disarmament.

It is no secret, however, that the attitude of the delegations of the NATO countries to disarmament, and their continued unwillingness to make greater strides forward stems from the fact that Western strategic conceptions are still based on the use of nuclear weapons; that is why the Western Powers make every effort to delay, in the process of disarmament, the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles, nuclear weapons and foreign military bases. However, should not the interests of peace and of nations have priority over the various military strategic conceptions of Western military circles? The rigid attitude of the delegations of the NATO countries to all -- and we do not hesitate to say this -- the principal problems of our work has proved to be the main obstacle to reaching agreement in the second part of the deliberations of our Committee.

The representatives who spoke before me, those of the Soviet Union and Romania, have already mentioned several instances in which the delegations of the socialist countries, in seeking agreement, met the Western delegations halfway. On the other hand, there has in effect been no change at all in the position of the United States and its allies because the United States amendments to the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I, and to the procedure of transition from stage to stage, although of some importance are not commensurate with the major concessions made by the delegations of the socialist countries.

Likewise, in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the persistent refusal of the Western Powers to accept the eight nation memorandum as a new compromise basis for discussion continues to be the obstacle preventing agreement on this important question. We sincerely desire that progress be made in the work of the Sub-Committee for the discontinuance of nuclear tests which will be meeting during our recess. However, if the delegations of the Western Powers continue to insist on their proposals of 27 August the prospects of progress will not be very great.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

It is the desire of our people that the discussions on disarmament should at last be crowned with success. Past disarmament discussions have convinced us with sufficient clarity that disarmament will not be achieved by too many words, formal discussions, or by setting up a number of Sub-Committees for the consideration of various subsidiary and technical problems, as has been suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom and again today by the representative of Canada. Our position is that prior to basic agreement on the principal problems of general and complete disarmament, the formation of such Sub-Committees or working groups can only further complicate our work and lead it astray. We do not wish either a return to the compromise practice of the League of Nations, or to the applications of the principle of "rocking the chair" to such an important problem as disarmament. Resolute deeds are needed for the achievement of this aim.

We should like to entertain the hope that the third phase of our Committee's work will prove to be a turning point for the better, and that the endeavours of the delegations of the socialist countries towards progress in negotiation on general and complete disarmament will ultimately meet with due understanding on the part of the delegations of the Western countries. There can be no doubt that in such a case -- and, moreover, with the substantial help rendered by the delegations of the neutral countries, whose valuable contribution to our work continues to increase -- it will be possible to achieve positive results in our discussions and to fulfil the world's expectations from our work.

In conclusion, I would like to join with those speakers who expressed their thanks and appreciation to both co-Chairmen for their work, as well as to the representative of the Acting Secretary-General, his deputy, and the whole staff of the Secretariat for their excellent work.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): At the end of this stage of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament we have been presented with a draft report to the United Nations General Assembly by the two co-Chairmen. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria did not raise any objections to the adoption of this draft report which presents a general picture of the course of our Conference's work, the discussions that have taken place, the decisions taken and the documents submitted. We cannot help remarking, however, that

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

the more we study this document -- and we have studied it carefully -- the less satisfied we feel with the work done so far by the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

It is impossible not to be struck by the meagre -- very meagre -- results obtained as compared with the lengthy discussions that have taken place during the eighty-two meetings of our Committee. We should remember that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5) approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations set the Conference the task of continuing its efforts without interruption until agreement on general and complete disarmament was achieved.

The chief desire of the peoples at the present time is to see the earliest possible elimination of the nuclear danger which threatens mankind. However, we have regretfully to recognize that after five months of negotiations the nuclear danger still hangs over the world. What is more, with the continuation of the armaments race, accelerated in the meantime by the United States tests which began at the end of April and which have been extended to outer space, the destructive capacity of the great nuclear Powers has increased still further, and with it the danger looming over mankind.

Nor has any progress been made on measures intended to create favourable conditions for the achievement of an agreement on disarmament and to strengthen confidence between peoples and States.

In our discussions in this Committee we cannot complain of any lack of verbal declarations on the part of the Western Governments in favour of general and complete disarmament. Indeed, since the adoption of the Agreed Principles for general and complete disarmament we have no longer heard such statements as were previously made in which the Western countries not only expressed doubts as to the possibility of building a durable peace through general and complete disarmament but openly opposed the very idea of general and complete disarmament.

We must also note that our Conference has received proposals providing the possibility and the means to arrive at its assigned purpose, the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and the earliest possible elimination, during the first stage of disarmament, of the danger of nuclear war. We are speaking of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on 15 March (ENDC/2). In addition,

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

proposals were made by the Soviet Union for the ending of nuclear tests, a problem which should present no difficulty in view of scientific and technical developments in the field of detection and identification of all seismic events.

Another possibility of ending nuclear tests once and for all, and at the earliest possible moment, was provided by the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers (ENDC/28). If this memorandum had been accepted as the basis for negotiation by all the nuclear Powers, a treaty on this question would have been worked out long ago. As is well known, the Soviet Union immediately accepted the memorandum as the basis for future negotiations. The Western Powers, however, at first received the memorandum with marked hostility. They declined to accept it as the basis for discussion. They still refuse to do so, even though they claim that they took account of the memorandum in producing their proposals.

Thus we are faced with a truly disheartening balance sheet of the work of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

What are the underlying reasons for this discouraging outcome of five months of work? It is not difficult to deduce the reasons from what I have said. They consist in the obstinate opposition of the Western Powers to every constructive proposal that is meant to promote the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Instead of making open statements against general and complete disarmament, as they used to do, the Western Powers now work more obliquely: they put forward proposals which not only do not lead to general and complete disarmament, but which, on the contrary, lead us away from it. They submit proposals in an effort to induce us to discuss control without any connexion with concrete disarmament measures. They propose the appointment of commissions and groups of experts to investigate a host of questions of detail, without any agreement on the disarmament measures to be carried out having been reached. These delaying tactics and the inflexible opposition of the Western Powers to any constructive proposal for approaching agreement on general and complete disarmament are the basic reasons for the almost total failure of our Committee to produce results.

Only this morning we heard a statement by the Canadian representative on the necessity of carrying out committee work and of reaching understanding on details before coming to an agreement on the major problems. It is certainly regrettable that we still have to hear such statements in which the speakers argue that, before taking political decisions on the principal questions of disarmament, we ought to

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

settle questions of detail and practical issues on which, it appears, the experts should first agree. If such a method of work had been adopted, it is doubtful if it would ever have been possible to agree on the solemn decision which was taken to achieve general and complete disarmament. If the Soviet Union and the United States had had to wait for agreement on the details of all these problems before announcing their decision to achieve general and complete disarmament, we should certainly never have succeeded in defining the Agreed Principles or in adopting the decisions that were taken by the General Assembly.

Another question which was raised this morning and which doubtless adds considerably to the difficulties of our task is that certain delegations wish to change things which are unalterable. For example, they have wished to alter grammar and to express by the word "could" what ought to be expressed by the word "shall". These are attempts which should not be made in the future. If they are, our Committee's debates will perhaps turn into a grammatical discussion, but they will give absolutely no results as regards general and complete disarmament.

These disappointing results of our Conference should not and cannot cause us to cease our efforts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament. But these results cannot fail to be noticed by the United Nations General Assembly whose session opens in ten days or so.

On the eve of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the peoples will certainly ask for explanations from those who are responsible for this deplorable state of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

Despite the failures so far, it is nevertheless possible to achieve positive results, and even prompt and important results, with a view to reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament. By the modifications, additions and suggestions which it has made on a large number of questions, the Soviet Union has shown great breadth of vision; it has agreed to concessions which prove that it is ready to consider any proposal likely to bring the positions nearer together, so long as it is compatible with the main object: general and complete disarmament.

At the last meeting, the Soviet Union declared itself ready, if the Western Powers, on their side, agree, to transfer all measures relating to the abolition of nuclear weapons --- including the destruction of stocks of these weapons and the cessation of their manufacture -- from the second to the first stage. This

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

corresponds to the opinions and desires expressed by many delegations during the first and second stages of our discussions. It is new evidence of the goodwill of the Soviet Union to do all in its power in the field of disarmament so as to reach agreement at the earliest possible moment.

But for an agreement to materialize, it is necessary that there should be goodwill on both sides. The Western Powers must be willing to accept genuine disarmament measures and try honestly to reconsider their inflexible positions which are preventing all progress on the road to disarmament.

The opposition which these Soviet proposals have met with is not encouraging.

This opposition was expressed only this morning by the United Kingdom representative. He demonstrated in striking fashion that, according to researches carried out in Great Britain, nuclear disarmament was totally impossible. If that is so, if we were to accept the reasoning of the United Kingdom representative, we do not see how the problem can ever be solved.

For agreement on disarmament to be reached and for general and complete disarmament to be achieved, it is not enough if only one of the parties makes concessions, if only one of the parties puts forward constructive proposals; the same goodwill and the same desire must be shown by the other party, that is to say, by the Western Powers.

In the light of all the discussions which have taken place at the Conference, in the light of the proposals and the suggestions made, including the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers, and especially in the light of the discussion which will be held at the United Nations General Assembly, the Western Powers must reconsider their barren and inflexible position on the question of general and complete disarmament. It is only by adopting proposals which do not block the way to general and complete disarmament that the Western Powers can help us to make genuine progress towards agreement and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, "the most important and urgent question facing mankind".

In conclusion, I should like first to express my thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Loutfi, who unfortunately is unable to be present at our meeting today. I also thank Mr. Epstein and all the staff who have given our Conference faultless service. Though the results of our Conference be rather disappointing, the United Nations staff have shown inexhaustible patience and have done all in their power to provide proper conditions for our work.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Lastly I wish strength and good health to our two co-Chairmen so that they may be able, despite almost non-existent progress, to stand up to their arduous task and create for the future at least the atmosphere in which we can exchange our views on the question of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India has been glad to note that today --- somewhat in contradistinction from the situation on the last day of the first part of our session --- there has been a notable lack of the polemical in the speeches which have been delivered. In certain statements indeed there has been a marked and, we believe, conscious effort --- and we are grateful for it --- to avoid the polemical altogether.

May I say that sometimes representatives of the two sides have said to some of us non-aligned delegations that in a sense the non-aligned delegations provide the audience in this room for the speeches which both sides make. I have no authority whatsoever to speak for my colleagues but I should like to say --- and I think that this would voice their sentiments and feelings --- that when we hear non-polemical speeches we are glad; when speeches become polemical we are disturbed. I think it is correct that we should say this and we should ponder over it on this concluding day of this session, because it seems to us that we must move further and further away from the polemical if we are going to make progress in this matter.

The question of grammar has been raised by two of our colleagues. This is not a matter of grammar, if I may say so; it is a question of a basic approach. If I may do so, with great respect, I should like to say to our colleagues around this table that I think we should consider whether we are right in opposing the plan of one side or the other. In this room frequently we hear reference to the position as follows: "We oppose such and such a plan." I would suggest that, if we continue in this course of frontal opposition to one plan or the other, then we shall only create a certain natural reaction of stubborn opposition on the other side, and this process of opposition will go on for ever.

If I may suggest the following at this moment, I do not think it would be entirely irrelevant. I am going to suggest that, if the two sides --- that is to say, the delegations of the Soviet Union, and the United States --- had been asked to

(Mr. Lall, India)

deposit two plans for general and complete disarmament on a certain date at a certain time, and if they had not known of the other side's detailed thinking on general and complete disarmament when this request was made to them, the plans which would have been deposited in those circumstances, I feel sure most of us would agree, would have had many more similarities than the present two plans have. In short --- and one has to take note of this fact, with a certain amount of historical regret, as it were, especially in the case of those of us who have followed disarmament for ten years or more --- when one side makes a proposal it seems as though it is almost necessary for the other side to avoid coming forward with a similar proposal.

Now, I think we are beginning to break through that phase; fortunately we are beginning at last to come to another phase, and I think we must break away completely from that past phase of trying to avoid similarities of approach. Unfortunately, the suspicion has been, and to a large extent remains, so great that that tendency lingers on. I submit to our colleagues that we must try not to oppose what the other side proposes; we must try to consider it, we must try to put ourselves in the position of the other side, we must try really to understand their approach and their difficulties. I say with great respect to both sides that unless they try to understand the position of the other side, to enter into the difficulties of the other side, then I am afraid we are going to continue in a situation in which there will just be no coming together. At the conclusion of this session we very much hope that it will be possible for us really to get beyond the tendency automatically to oppose each other and to try to understand each other's points of view, and we feel that unless this change can take place progress will regrettably continue to be an extremely elusive objective.

The representative of the Soviet Union said at the beginning of his speech that we were unfortunately no closer to general and complete disarmament than on the day negotiations began. That is a sobering and a sad fact, and we feel that the cause of it lies in this continuation from the past of the tendency to oppose the other side and not to understand the other side's position.

May I say in conclusion that we are very glad that the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests will continue to work during the recess. We support the very wise

(Mr. Lall, India)

suggestion made by our colleague Mr. Padilla Nervo -- and if I may say so his whole statement the other day struck me as a very wise one -- that if necessary the Eighteen Nation Committee should be available to work in New York during the General Assembly session.

Finally, we hope that in our future work we shall find it possible to put ourselves in the position of the other side. I say with respect to the Soviet Union that it should look at this whole question of disarmament during the recess from the point of view of the United States, and to the United States that it should look at the whole problem of disarmament from the point of view of the Soviet Union. I think that kind of exercise is essential if we are to make progress and I hope that we can come back to this Conference when it resumes in that spirit.

The delegation of India of course joins all those who have thanked the United Nations in all its aspects for the enormous help it has given us in our work. We have not achieved disarmament, but that is certainly not the fault of the United Nations.

Mr. ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): This is, I suppose, the last meeting before the recess which starts tomorrow, and the moment to say au revoir to each other. Our stay here together has really been a very pleasant one, and I wish to express to each and every delegation the gratitude of my delegation for all the kindness, courtesy and friendliness it has received from all of them. There may be a difference of opinion as to what has been achieved in this long Conference as regards our work, but there can be no difference of opinion as regards our achievement in one respect -- namely, in the establishment of a friendly and comradely relationship among all the individual representatives taking part as well as the respective delegations. I have always observed, as I am sure all of you have, that as soon as the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and other countries aligned with one or other of the so-called military blocs get out of this room they rush, breaking the artificial, imposed line, pulled and pushed by the natural and reciprocal force of human relationship, to mix, to chat, to joke and to pat each other's shoulders. What a wonderful force this human relationship is; this human relationship, this human feeling transcending all artificially constructed barriers is a wonderful thing

(Mr. Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

indeed. Only when they come back into this room, only when they take their seats behind the names of their respective countries, do those representatives assume different personalities; only then do they start to make accusations and counter-accusations, and even sometimes to throw harsh words at each other. Observing all this, one would think it was not the people but the names of their respective countries that suspect each other, that are afraid of each other and that are engaged in this dangerous armaments race which may one day lead to mutual extinction.

We hope the representatives of those great nations will retain the warm human feeling which they have shared here and which, carried with them, may be shared equally by their respective great countries. We hope they will come back with the full blessing of their respective countries to sign a treaty ending war, fear and suspicion for ever.

I thank each and every member of all delegations, who have given me and the members of my delegation their full and unfailing co-operation. We thank the special representative of the Secretary-General and his deputy, the interpreters, the verbatim reporters and the members of the Secretariat, some of them invisible to us, who have made it possible for our work to be conducted in an efficient and smooth manner.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The representative of the United States has asked for the floor in order to make a short statement.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): A number of representatives have thanked the Acting Secretary-General and the Secretariat. I would just like to suggest that it would be quite appropriate for you, Sir, in your capacity as Chairman, to thank the Acting Secretary-General, his representative here, Mr. Loutfi, Mr. Epstein, Mr. Cornil and all the members of the Secretariat for the very able and useful work they have done. I join my distinguished co-Chairman in extending our congratulations to the interpreters. I sometimes wonder if we realize the tremendous efficiency of this organization. The other day we held two meetings and we also had meetings of the Sub-Committee and of the co-Chairmen on the draft report, and all the verbatim records were on our desks first thing

(Mr. Dean, United States)

next morning. That represented an enormous amount of painstaking and highly efficient work, and I would think it appropriate for you, Mr. Chairman, if you agree with me, to express those thanks on behalf of the representatives.

I should like one more minute, and then I shall have finished. As I understand the symbolism of the murals, the one on my left shows the victors returning home with their dead; to the right are the vanquished with their dead; but at the top are the revanchists, calling for revenge even in defeat. The reason I persist in calling your attention to these murals is that I want to stake out my claim to lecture on them when I have a grey beard and my job as co-Chairman is finished.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): That concludes our list of speakers for today, and it is with some reluctance that I am burdening the Committee with another statement, but a very brief one. I feel, however, that I would fail in my duty as Chairman if I did not before we separate add a few words to those already spoken.

This Committee has, during the eighty-two plenary meetings held since we met in the spring, worked hard and intensely on the tasks before us. The heaviest burden has been carried by our co-Chairmen, and our thanks go in the first place to them for their never failing efforts to find ways in a difficult and rough terrain. I also know that I can speak on behalf of all delegations when I express our thanks to the special representatives of the Acting Secretary-General, to Mr. Loutfi, who has already left us, and Mr. Epstein, and to the members of the Secretariat, to all those we have been used to seeing in this hall and who, inter alia, have rapidly provided us with verbatim records in which we have been able to carry out our diligent scrutinizing for useful quotations, to those who have dressed our thoughts in other clothes than we ourselves have given them, and to those who behind the scenes have been responsible for the whole machinery. They have all contributed to the carrying forward of our work.

We would certainly all have wanted to report more substantial progress to the General Assembly than we have been able to do in the document which has been adopted this morning. We are, however, aware that the question of disarmament is extremely complicated and that no ready-made solutions are waiting around the corner. When we now separate we can do it knowing that in spite of all certain progress has been made; on some points a rapprochement has taken place between the different views.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

Our most urgent task has been to reach an agreement banning for all time all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and many statements have reflected an understandable and mounting impatience that we have not so far reached any definite solution. But it should not be too daring to hope that as a result of our deliberations a solution is now more nearly within reach. In this connexion I wish to express our satisfaction that the representatives of the nuclear Powers have been able to agree that their work in the Sub-Committee on a test ban treaty should continue during the recess. However much I would like to wish our hardworking colleagues in the Sub-Committee a restful recess, I cannot in all sincerity do this. Their work will be followed by the expectations of all members of this Conference and of the whole world that they will not give up until this sword of Damocles now hanging over our heads has been removed. Both with our intellect and with our hearts we wish them success in their continued endeavours.

Finally I wish all representatives a very fruitful recess.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-second plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Edberg, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union, Romania, the United Kingdom Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, India, Ethiopia and Sweden.

"The Conference adopted a second interim progress report for the period 1 June 1962 to 8 September 1962 to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 12 November 1962, at 10 a.m., unless decided otherwise according to agreed procedures."

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

